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Abstract
This text begins with a criticism of discourses about the notion of ‘digital
divide’. Regardless of the identity of their authors (politicians, G8 ‘experts’,
activists), these speeches are mostly based on technical determinism and on a
confusion between information and its support. This paper studies the qual-
ity and the functions of the measures of the supposed ‘digital divide’, that
serve above all to legitimize a posteriori this notion of divide, whilst ex-
pressing prejudices about nations and societies, mostly on the basis of one
indicator: the ratio of Internet users of each country. Potentialities of digital
writing are outlined, as well as the knowledge needed to profit from them.
This knowledge is unsurprisingly linked to traditional kinds of capital (eco-
nomical, social, and intellectual). Hence, few people can benefit from data
processing. Finally, behing the ‘digital divide’ and the solution proposed to
bridge it (investing in equipment), one discovers a very deep cognitive seg-
regation related to the diffusion of the digital systems of writing.
then shows that the internet is merely a revelator of the rifts of our soci-
eties, the most critical one being the cognitive divide.
1 A fuzzy concept
The notion of ’digital divide’1 is as well spread as it is badly defined. Politi-
cians pick it up, the World Bank and the G8 pretend to bridge it, activists
worry about it. This wide consensus to use an unclear notion, among so-
cial groups opposed to each other, makes this notion appear fragile from a
scientific point of vue.
1.1 Virtues of the ‘new technologies’
The word ‘divide’ suggests a separation between people who have access
to digital information, and the others, who don’t; it induces the idea of a
barrier, where one side is much more comfortable than the opposite one.
To avoid this, some argue, one must ensure that every citizen accesses the
1In French, fracture numérique or fossé numérique.
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‘new technologies’, or that the coming ‘information society’ should have
no outsiders. These discourses, widespread among the administrators of the
European Union, are actually directly imported from the USA: as early as
1992, Al Gore evoked the virtues of the ‘information society’. Bangemann
introduced them in Europe in 1994.
Behind the project to take care of the poor and of the electronic have-
nots, lies the promise of a great departure towards a bright future, of a col-
lective adventure offered by the ‘new technologies’. This belief has a name:
technical determinism; it maintains that technology determines the organisa-
tion of society. The idea is surely seductive, but naïve and old. For David
Edgerton [Edgerton 1998], the evocation of the positive effects of the modern
techniques on the social organisation is a recurring event in all the twentieth
century; its main effect is the reduction of political criticism: the promise
of a close future, happy and without worry, limits the protest against the
present world. The diffusion of technical determinism, including its gen-
erous speeches about diminishing the digital divide (for instance by Third
World activists) further promotes the ruling order.
When the notion of digital divide is linked with technical determinism, it
appears to be an ideological or a political concept rather than a scientific one.
1.2 Uses of information
One can hope that the notion of information is more relevant than invoca-
tions of modernity to explain socially differentiated uses of digital items.
Indeed, digital information brings opportunities of ‘manipulation’ and treat-
ment which are not offered by former supports. But the notion of information
vary between pure noise2 and texts with a real informative value. And mostly,
the latter sense is prefered: any sequence of bits is quickly considered as in-
formative. Nevertheless, one can doubt that the received spam advertising
Viagra, Xanax, or naked girls on videos is really the ideal way to bridge the
digital gap.
If one adds to this electronic pollution the proliferation of worms and
other electronic viruses, and the on-line sales of bad films, the probability is
high that, all things considered, the quality of electronic information is very
poor and without any added value: effectively, this way to valorise raw infor-
mation masks the modes of appropriation of those to whom it is addressed,
and the treatments they can apply to it. This point will be argued later; but
a study on digital tools of treatment of the information (for instance lexico-
metrical or cartographical ones) quickly reveals how meager their use is, and
that the benefit of such tools on non digital ones is not granted, especially if
one includes time in the costs3.
In a general way, any study of information and its uses refers to writ-
ing, knowledge (and its ways of transmission and assimilation), and more
generally, to the notion of literacy. But this concept is most complex, sub-
ject of deep debates between anthropologists, linguists and historians. The
risk is high that the politicians who implicitly employ the notion of literacy
in the context of digital information use it in fact as an advertising slogan,
2As data flows, in the historical meaning of Shannon when he conceived his information theory.
3For instance, the time waisted to eradicate a virus, to restore lost datas, etc.
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without understanding it. For instance, the French president Jacques Chirac
claimed in 2000 that ‘the communicating computer becomes the universal
encyclopaedia of the twenty-first century’ [Chirac 2000]. The formulation
is nice, but it totally eludes the whole range of social and cognitive processes
occurring in the constitution and the transmission of knowledge: is it the pa-
per fibre which makes the value of the encyclopaedia or its contents? How is
the network of people constituted which engages in such a production? The
French President implicitly evokes the Diderot Encyclopaedia, which is the
archetype of the French production of the Age of Enlightenment. But does
he remember that this was mostly the work of political opponents, who were
savagely censured by the political power of the time?
Lastly, how can one evoke a store of knowledge without wondering about
the language in which it would be written? Undoubtedly, the encyclopaedia
of today would not be written in French...
Thus, the call for information, and its supposed virtues when it is in dig-
ital form, or accomplished in a social dimension, hardly seems convincing
when the digital gap and its stakes are evoked.
1.3 Dictatorship of numbers
What remains?
The speeches on ‘new technologies’ are a consequence of the technical
determinism, and those on ‘information society’ an element of political log-
orrhea. The possible benefits of a supposed society of knowledge and infor-
mation being too difficult to explain and measure, people frequently choose
to estimate them through statistics applied to material objects. One could for
example compare knowledge of countries by counting the number of trucks
of each one, since the books are mainly distributed by terrestrial routes. That
is partly what the administrators of the European Union propose: « It is nec-
essary to give to Europeans the knowledge which they need to live and work
in the new economy. That starts at school. The schools must have multime-
dia computers in a sufficient number and quick Internet connections», Erkki
Liikanen affirms [Liikanen 2000]. Here, the confusion between measures of
a possible mental activity and statistics about material stuff is manifest, and
nourishes the critics claiming that the evocation of the digital divide aims
above all to making people buy computers.
This material estimate has certain advantages : it makes it possible to
recycle the figures which the salesmen of data processing and associated ser-
vices produce to have an idea of the number of their current or potential cus-
tomers. Thus the concept of ‘Internet user’ appears: it is of course a person
who connected herself to the Internet. But when and with which frequency?
These questions are almost indiscreet. The current tendency consists in for-
getting the frequency and in considering simply that any person approaching
a computer connected to a network once per quarter is an Internet user. With
rare exceptions, the questions relating to the duration and the quality of con-
nection are also forgotten.
From there, various organisations, e.g. CIA, endeavour to measure, for
each country, indices of the digital practices. Those are rather fuzzy, and
seem in fact indices of comfort or modernity: one points out gross domestic
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product (GDP) and population, then the numbers of main lines of telephone,
mobile cellular telephones4, ISP (Internet service providers) and finally In-
ternet users. One then learns (from the CIA, but also from other organisations
or companies, because they all give the same results), that there was one fixed
telephone line per capita in Monaco, but one for 250 in Mali5; two million
Internet users in Belgium, against 30 000 in Angola (both countries have the
same population, but the Belgian GDP per capita is 20 times higher than
the Angolan one); that there are a thousand times less cellular telephones in
Cuba than in Sweden, for populations appreciably equivalent6.
I shall not here seek to check the relevance of such numbers7.
However, both this kind of indicators and the comparisons which they
induce show that one measures wealth or a propensity to spend, rather than
real or potential abilities. A complementary proof is given by the strong
correlation between the percentage of Internet users and the GDP per capita:
0,87 (calculated for the 163 most populated countries). The number of luxury
cars or private jets would have been quite as relevant to classify the nations.
‘New technologies’ are here confused with equipment, and the reference to
the information and its uses is swept away by indicators dedicated to the
telephone companies. That is what the map of the Internet users in 2002
shows (see Fig. 1).
If one uses the rate of Internet users measured by the CIA as an indica-
tor of the richness of the nations, the inverse reading of this map shows a
phenomenon known for a long time, but often understated: the slip of many
Central and Southern European countries (among which Germany, Spain,
France and Italy) into the ‘second World’: in Europe, only the Netherlands,
Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ice-
land, Denmark) have high rates of Internet users. Apart from these countries,
the only ones to exceed a rate of Internet users of 50% are the United States
(59,17 %8), Australia (51,47%), and the two ambivalent ‘satellites’ of China
which are Hong-Kong (53,81%) and Taiwan (51,45%). On the other hand,
the very poor countries, like the African ones, have obviously the lowest rates
of Internet users. However, if account of their GDP is taken (or of the electric
supply cover of these countries), one is not surprised by these figures.
The authors of the statistics even fall into their own trap: if one divides
the number of Internet users by the GDP, which is a good way to eliminate
the nation wealth parameter, one discovers that the first country for this indi-
cator is... Palestine (7,83), followed by Estonia (3,81), Taiwan (2,99), Swe-
den (2,57) and South Korea (2,56). Other countries, like the United States
4This insistence on telephony in the statistics on the uses of digital items is strange: the true
instrument of communication with which the user does not feel the effect of the digital item is the
telephone, mostly used for oral communication.
545 000 main telephone lines in Mali in 2000, date of the estimate, for 11 340 800 inhabitants;
31 027 lines in Monaco for 31 987 inhabitants. For these datas and the next ones, the source is
[CIA 2002]
63 835 000 in Sweden (estimate of 1998) for 8.9 million inhabitants, and 2 994 in Cuba (est.
1997) for 11,2 million inhabitants.
7Even if one would have liked to know the sampling protocol enabling to find the 50 000 Sudanese
Internet users or the 2 994 Cuban owners of cellular phones.
8Third position behind Sweden — 63,54% — and Iceland — 60,13% —.
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Figure 1: Internet users. The original map is in the file carteMondeNB.pdf. Here
is just a (small) copy for the editors, but not for the publisher.
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or France, are far behind (1,63, rank 23; and 0,77, rank 53). One can then
explain this strong use of the electronic communication in Palestine by the
argument that this non-state is reduced to a sum of parse prisons which one
cannot leave. Consequently, the immaterial tools of communication are over-
used. But one can also be cynical and consider that Palestine is an ideal
market for the companies of telecommunication, which can make large prof-
its there, since there are a few million people, undoubtedly very poor, but
ready to spend for the Internet. One could accordingly present Palestine like
a model solution of the digital divide problem in the Third World, as some
experts of G8 do not hesitate to do with Bangladesh9.
1.4 Concepts legitimated a posteriori
It is important to bear in mind the power of figures and indicators, when they
once have been produced. No matter if they are false, or produced from erro-
neous perceptions of social phenomena: once published, they get a value of
truth such that they become references for political debates; thus, they legit-
imate the concepts which they are supposed to evaluate. As that frequently
happens in the social sciences, the figure produces the category more than
being its consequence or measure.
Some authors refuse these figures because they are used to hide others.
For instance, Daniel Pimienta maintains that the compassion concerning the
digital divide is used by G8 to give itself good conscience, and perhaps to
make people forget the permanent medical and food divides [Pimienta 2002].
That is all the more possible since, as seen above, the material measures of
the digital divide naturally invite to reduce it by investing in equipment.
More generally, the reasoning which one can build on such figures is
weak. For example, if one returns to the ratio Internet users / GDP, one
can offer a thousand interpretations, all of them a posteriori: the situation of
Palestine would symbolize the possibility of resisting oppression thanks to
‘new technologies’ (proof of their democratic virtues?); that of South Korea
would highlight the impact of the use of ‘new technologies’ on the economy
(while offering a publicity for liberalism); that of Sweden would prove their
social function. And so on.
On the other hand, from the mere rate of Internet users, an analyst in a
hurry and in love with synthetic figures like the GDP or the IQ, will com-
pare Hong Kong and Norway, since their rates of Internet users are similar
(53,81% and 54,14%); or Japan and Austria (37,08% and 36,72%), France
and Malaysia (19,58% and 18,09%), Russia and Palestine (6,35% and 4,89%).
However, every thing distinguishes these couples of countries: culture, indus-
trial and political history, geography, etc.
9Here is an example of the rhetoric of the ‘DOT Force’, or Digital Opportunity Task Force,
associating ‘new technologies’, access to knowledge and emancipation of the poorest of the poor, the
women : ‘As underlined in his first report to the leaders of G8, ‘access to knowledge and information
is essential for the modern human development’. This great principle underlies the continuous work
of the GEANT and the determination of its members to increase the contribution of ICT to the
development in all its kinds and levels. One now starts to see examples of the entitling capacity of
these technologies. [...] In Bangladesh, many poor women see their quality of life increase thanks to
innovative use of the cellular telephone.’. [DOT Force 2002].
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Thus, any national prejudice or preconception can be infered from a pos-
teriori interpretations of this numerical list. This kind of abuse seems uni-
formly widespread when people absolutely want to measure social practices
: among the engineers, the politicians and the activists, even among some
economists, the figure has a crowned value, and prevents from questioning
the foundations, even when those are in fact mere prejudices.
2 Which measures?
2.1 Technology of the intellect
Even though the myths of ‘new technologies’ and of the power of digital in-
formation appear disconnected from reality and to that extent irrational, they
do have a modest logical foundation: computers were performed to count
and write, and the Web was invented to facilitate the intellectual exchanges
between scientists.
It should be borne in mind that data processing and the Internet take
part of a recomposition of our writing systems, about which Jack Goody
reminds us that they belong to the technology of the intellect [Goody 1994,
Goody 2000]: our thought is not pure nor is it dematerialized, it is based
essentially on the writing, which gives it technical and social dimensions.
A social one, because the writing allows the confrontation with the thought
of others. Technical, as one can see with the system of signs which one
uses to write and communicate, a system which refers above all to methods
and know-how (control of the alphabet, but also layout, use of abbreviations,
etc.); but especially with the whole set of material (and industrial) objects
which help us to read, write notes, carry out calculations, sort, produce dia-
grams: papyrus, codex, sliding rules, Cd-rom, etc. But this description is still
too manicheist, giving the impression that the material serves the thought. In
fact, even more than with a system of signs represented by a wide alphabet,
the cognitive activity and the supports of the writing are closely bound by the
procedures, the tools which we invent to apprehend the text; for instance, ta-
bles of content at the end of the books, index or their current generalization:
search engines. Softwares fall under this category. The tools we conceive
belong completely to the writing (the system of signs is not distinct from
the whole of the instruments which are used to apprehend it10) and at the
same time to the cognitive activity (it is difficult to think without writing and
reading, and thus without controlling the whole of the instruments associated
with the writing).
In this context, a recomposition of the instruments of writing virtually
transforms our mental capacities. For instance, the ability to produce and
handle (and hence to reorder, classify, etc.) long lists of words, of figures,
contributes to the constitution of a reasoning, and shows in a different way
the contents of these lists11; the same for the ability to organize our thought
from the multiple maps and graphs we carry out, through numerical or textual
10This is very clear with data processing: the binary code of the writing, stored on an electronic
medium, is not accessible without drivers and software.
11Process of distanciation.
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data. For these kinds of productions, the potential effects of the computers
and softwares are manifest.
But between these virtualities and reality, there is a gap. And there, the
concept of literacy, this blend of culture and alphabetism, takes sense. The
mental activity is often acquired by training. It takes approximately 20 years
to control the whole of the instruments and methods related to the exercise
of a rational thought. It is difficult to see how the diffusion of material items
could shorten this time of training, if these devices are (as they seem to be)
objects of consumption rather than tools which prolong the processes of writ-
ing: one imagines with difficulty how to seek a book in a library if one cannot
read, as one scarcely imagines to become a mathematician merely because
one was offered a digital TV.
2.2 Cognitive segregation
This ‘gap’, this vast question of the intellectual benefits of the digital writing
is rarely, if ever, clarified. The reasons are obvious: the acquisition of an
intellectual capital adapted to the digital writing and the realisation of such
potentialities are particularly delicate and are reserved to a very small number
of people, the scholars of today (notably, data processing specialists, and
academics).
Here can be expressed the digital divide, and in a violent way: before
benefitting from the contemporary systems of writing, one necessarily needs
a strong economical capital, to acquire a computer and a link to the networks;
but also a social capital, to get help when one does not understand how a
software, an on-line service, or one’s computer works (or not); and finally a
cultural one, as we have then to know how to find the information which we
seek, and to treat it.
However the people in the world who have such wealths are rare. And
neither the cybercafés, nor the networks of teenagers can make up such
deficits, whatever all the ‘experts’ of the DOT Force can say. Moreover, one
can measure these forms of inequalities. For example, lack of cultural capi-
tal: a survey amoung 4 million of Internet users, in France, 2001, showed that
87% of them could not use properly a search engine [Guichard 2002]. This
figure, enormous, is nevertheless coherent with surveys carried out among
students and academics: the control of these intellectual instruments of a
new type is really not easy, and needs years of training. One thus realises the
huge disparity between a cognitive Utopia (acquisition of knowledge via the
ICT) and its alleged measures through rates of equipment.
Finally, even if one accepts the figure of the CIA relating to France
(19,58% Internet users), the French rate on the bad side of the digital bar-
rier would be 97,5%12! If that is so, which is the rate of the Third World
countries?
The digital divide exists, but it is merely the translation of a violent cul-
tural and intellectual segregation, which further develops with ‘new technolo-
gies’.
12100 - (19,58 * (1 - 0,87))
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